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MEDIA POLICY
Polarised television audiences.  
The outcomes of the Estonian  




Abstract. The European Union’s (EU) liberalisation of media policies 
and its content quality bias towards economic efficiency has resulted in a 
situation where, in some small markets like Estonia, the audience is divided 
into two parts. The Russian-speaking audience in Estonia mainly follows 
Russian state TV channels, and the Estonian-speaking audience watches 
Estonian television channels. This has happened even though the EU media 
policy should ensure freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media 
pluralism. Findings from the Estonian case study show that despite the noble 
aim of the EU media policy, Estonia has two radically different information 
fields: Estonian-language media promotes European values, and Russian 
state media, enjoying high popularity among the Russian speakers, promotes 
‘Putin’s values’. 
The question is whether the EU legal instrument — Audiovisual Me-
dia Service Directive (AVMSD) — is an efficient tool when disinformation 
from third countries is disseminated with the aim of gaining a political in-
fluence over the EU member states’ citizens. The recommendation is that 
the AVMSD should be revised in a way that prevents unfair competition 
directed from third countries and tools should be developed to compensate 
for market failures.
Keywords: European Union media policy, Russian-speaking audience, 
public service broadcasting , Estonian Public Broadcasting.
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2015 Nr. 8
6
Introduction
This article argues that the Estonian government’s ‘idealisation’ 
of market forces — supported by the European Union media policy, 
which is driven by common market ideology — does not take into ac-
count media companies’ actual capability to provide a large range of 
media services and thus limits the offering of quality local content to 
all groups in society. Until recently, this has been interpreted mainly as 
an economic issue, but the events in Ukraine and the increasing wave 
of Russian propaganda has put this issue in a different light, falling un-
der the national security domain. This is the first time that Europe as 
a whole must tackle this specific media service sphere, leading to the 
questions of how to handle Russian propaganda and how to prevent its 
influence on EU citizens. In Estonia, and in other Baltic states as well, 
the influence of Russian propaganda on the Russian-speaking audience 
is of great concern. There is no mutual understanding about the role 
and possible impact of the Russian language television programming, 
but the fact is that Russian television channels enjoy a significant popu-
larity among the Russian-speaking audiences (Saar Poll, 2104; Seppel, 
2015).  
How, by whom and to what extent television programmes for the 
Russian-speaking audiences in EU member states are created is a politi-
cal issue which is influenced by internal and external security questions, 
overall economics and by EU media policy, and this debate has strong 
historical roots. 
Population changes from Soviet times to present
Before World War II, Estonia was a relatively homogenous nation 
state; 88.1 per cent of Estonia’s inhabitants were Estonians, and larger 
minorities included Russians and Germans. Estonian was the nation-
al language; all the main spheres of the state (political leadership and 
management, education, science and culture) were executed in Esto-
nian. The war led to drastic changes: from the 1940s onwards, after be-
ing incorporated into the Soviet Union, Estonia lost nearly one-fifth of 
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its population due to mass repression, war activities and political exile. 
Due to mass immigration from the Soviet Union’s member republics, 
especially from the Russian Federation, Estonia’s population became 
multinational in only a few decades. The newcomers were mainly Rus-
sians and Ukrainians and Belarusians who spoke Russian. In the Soviet 
Union, the Russian language had the status of being the language of 
communication between and within different nations, meaning that in 
practice Russian was used as the official language. The majority of the 
Russians who had moved to Estonia after WWII never learned the lo-
cal language or became part of the Estonian community; rather, they 
formed their own Russian-speaking community, which, by the end of 
the 1980s, accounted for 35.2 per cent of Estonia’s population. The re-
gaining of independence by Estonia in 1992 caused large-scale transfor-
mations in politics and economics. The majority of the large trans-union 
industries lost their market and fell apart. The Soviet Army was pulled 
out of Estonia in 1994. Noteworthy numbers of the Russian-speaking 
population lost their occupations and began to move elsewhere. There 
has been a significant decrease and nationality ratio change in Estonia’s 
population during the last two decades. In 1990, the total population 
was 1.57 million, which included 61.5 per cent of Estonians. In 2014, the 
total population had decreased to 1.31 million, among whom 69.1 per 
cent were Estonians; still, 30.3 per cent of the population in age group 15-
74 declared that their first language is Russian (Estonian Statistics, 2015).
A paradigm shift
Starting at the end of the 1980s, Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries aimed to change from being a communist regime to 
becoming free democratic welfare states. Among important aspects 
of that development were changes in the media systems; ‘Europeani-
zation’, as defined by Jakubowicz (2003), took place. One of the key 
drivers of that shift was an attempt to replace Soviet media policy with 
the Western, soon to become, Pan-European media policy. The over-
all aims of Pan-European media policy are preserving cultural diver-
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sity and safeguarding media pluralism. To meet these aims, there are 
two main approaches to organizing the media: the free market liberal 
and collectivist-statist strategies. Coming from the communist regime, 
an alternative, the collective provision, was difficult to introduce due 
to the experiences of the recent past. Therefore, the first strategy was 
mainly introduced in CEE countries, especially in the Baltic States. The 
free market liberal approach was supported by the EU media policy, 
which is a common market ideology. The main European legislative 
document — the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), 
and its predecessor, the Television Without Frontiers Directive — does 
not take into account country-specific circumstances such as the size 
of the national (and media) market, economic conditions or specific 
cultural and historical contexts. However, these are important factors, 
which have a strong influence on media development and performance. 
Market size determines resource availability. In smaller states, there are 
fewer resources available (Lowe et al., 2011). Due to market limita-
tions, it is unprofitable to launch a wide range of media products on 
smaller markets. The diversity of content offered will be lower in smal-
ler states than on large markets. In the first place, commercial media 
focuses on mainstream content. But if the market is not big enough for 
private sector to deliver variety of media products in national language 
how then interests of minority groups are served? From economic 
perspective Russian-speaking audience in small countries is a tiny 
unpro fitable niche market ( Jõesaar et al., 2014). At this particular case 
Estonian market-based media system is incapable of presenting a full 
range of political and economic interests in the public domain, espe-
cially for language minorities. 
When talking about the economic background of multilingual mar-
kets, Hesmondhalgh (2013) refers to the preferences of different ethnic 
groups and defines these markets as geocultural markets. These markets 
are not homogeneous. Even if there is a shared history among countries, 
its interpretation still remains largely different for main ethnic groups. 
It is more relevant to talk about geolinguistics and diasporic media. 
There are definitely some positive examples of cross-border television 
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execution with cultural consequences, but the separation of the Rus-
sian-speaking audience from the Estonian information field caused by 
viewing of foreign Russian channels creates many challenges for Esto-
nian society. Gitlin (1999) argues whether democracy requires a public 
or a set of publics, a public sphere or ‘separate public sphericules’. It can 
be so, but according to the Habermasian theory of public sphere, these 
sphericules must also have a higher communication space or sphere, 
otherwise there will be isolated ‘islands of different groups’ in society. 
It is argued that if there are no ongoing negotiations among members 
of different groups, then media can provide help. Media policy should 
be developed to support these communication processes and to secure 
media stakeholders’ adequate performance. 
TV broadcasting in Estonia: two information spheres
In Estonia, fulfilment of aforementioned principles is guaranteed for 
the media targeting the native part of population: Estonians. Valuation 
of the public service media (PSM) performance is more problematic 
Figure 1. Average weekly share of viewing in Estonia in 2014. Age group 4+,  
Estonians and non-Estonians. Source: authors’ calculations based on TNS Emor data.
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in case of the Russian-speaking audience. Raadio 4, the Russian-lan-
guage public-service radio channel, mainly serves the interests of Rus-
sian speakers. The limited size of the target audience (around 350.000 
people) makes broadcasting in Russian an unprofitable activity for 
commercial broadcasters, and therefore, there are no private nation-
wide television programmes in Russian in Estonia.   
Hence, Estonia faces challenges in providing pluralistic reliable con-
tent for all of society, especially the Russian-speaking (also referred to 
as non-Estonian) part of society. The result is that a major part of the 
Russian-speaking audience is actually not inside the country’s internal 
information sphere but is actually a member of the Russian state’s infor-
mation sphere (Figure 1).
Research data (Saar Poll, 2014) show that among Estonians and 
non-Estonians, the frequency of following the news is similar. As ex-
pected, the differences are present in the sources of information that 
Estonians and non-Estonians consider important for following current 
events. When it comes to types of media, for both Estonians and non-
Estonians, television is number one. For Estonians, Estonian Television 
(a public service broadcaster) is the main source of information, with 
81 per cent of the respondents considering it very important or rather 
important. For 72 per cent of the non-Estonians, the most important 
sources of information are Russian state television channels (e.g. PBK, 
RTR Planeta Baltic, NTV Mir or Ren TV Estonia) (Figure 2). 
The Saar Poll’s (2014) study participants were also asked who, in 
their opinion, was responsible for shooting down the Malaysian pas-
senger airplane in the Eastern part of Ukraine. Among both Estonians 
and non-Estonians, a large share of respondents did not know how to 
respond to the question (40 per cent of Estonians and 47 per cent of 
non-Estonians). This is evidence of how, regardless of ethnicity, a very 
large proportion of people have difficulty forming an opinion based 
on the information that they have. Among those respondents with an 
opinion, a distinct difference is present (Figure 3):
11
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Figure 2. Importance of the media channels among Estonians and non-Estonians 
(Russian speakers). 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Saar Poll 2014.
Figure 3. Responses to the survey question: ‘Lately there has been a lot of talk about 
the Malaysian passenger airplane that was shot down in Eastern Ukraine and who 
could be possibly responsible. In your opinion, who is responsible for shooting down 
the plane?’ (Since each respondent could give more than one answer, the sum of 
percentages can be over 100). 
Source: Saar Poll, 2014: Figure 19.
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•  Estonian respondents stated that either the Russian government 
(34 per cent of respondents) and/or the Ukrainian separatists 
(31 per cent of respondents) were responsible.
•  Non-Estonian respondents primarily stated that the government 
of Ukraine was responsible (38 per cent of respondents). 
The findings of the survey indicate that two radically different infor-
mation fields exist in Estonia: Estonian language media promotes Eu-
ropean values, while Russian language media promotes ‘Putin’s values’. 
Paradoxically, the legal framework established by the AVMSD guaran-
tees the existence of both.
Criticisms of the AVMSD
Why has the EU media policy — which aims to guarantee media 
pluralism and diversity needs for the development of democracy — re-
sulted in a situation where in some member states, a remarkable part of 
the population is strongly tied to the non-European information field? 
The answer can be found in the fact that the EU media regulation does 
not take into account different economic (including factors such as the 
size of the market, availability of resources, international competition 
etc.), historical or cultural differences between member states. The 
AVMSD should help to achieve the objectives of the EU. The directive 
should ensure freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media 
pluralism. The question is whether it is also an efficient tool when disin-
formation from third countries is disseminated with the aim of gaining 
political influence over a member state’s citizens. 
The EU’s liberalisation of media policies and its content quality bias 
towards economic efficiency has resulted in a situation where, in some 
small national markets (for example Latvia, Estonia and Moldova), the 
most profitable broadcasting business models are based on the rebroad-
casting of Russian state-controlled TV programs and advertising sales 
to these channels. The EU’s aim of securing free movement of capital 
and services has, in reality, ended up supporting the dissemination of 
Russian propaganda. Re-broadcasters of Russian TV channels are sel-
ling commercial airtime in the Estonian market, and the money earned 
will leave Estonia, thus, weakening the Estonian audiovisual industry. 
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These actions can be seen as politically motivated price dumping in the 
advertising market. 
This business model is supported by the Russian state and the distri-
bution of Russian propaganda content serves Russia’s political agenda. 
Due to unfair economic competition from abroad and market failures, 
the Estonian private sector is not able to serve language minorities with 
locally produced media content. Ruling governments have paid little 
attention to this issue and possess only a moderate desire to grant the 
necessary funds to Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR); this has not 
enabled ERR to fulfil its remit to serve minority interests. Without the 
support of the EU’s strongly binding legal instruments, Estonian public 
service broadcasting lacks the funding required to achieve the same po-
werful and legitimate position that Western European and Nordic public 
broadcasters hold. In these circumstances, instead of the EU Commis-
sion’s concerns of overfunding of PSBs, and looking for possible viola-
tion of the state aid regulation, there should be EU legal instruments to 
ensure that PSBs are not underfunded. In cases of underfunding, it is 
clear that PSB remits might not be fulfilled and minorities’ rights to re-
ceive democratic and pluralistic content may not be protected. 
Conclusions
In conclusion, the AVMSD should be revised to prevent unfair com-
petition that stems from third countries. Tools should also be developed 
to avoid undue media concentration and to compensate for market fai-
lures. The unfair competition posed by the rebroadcasting of Russian 
television programmes should actually fall under competition law, but 
it is extremely difficult to take any action against third country broad-
casters on that legal basis. The Creative Europe programme cannot pro-
vide a permanent solution to Estonia’s uncompetitive production and 
broadcasting industries, although it might offer some short-term relief. 
Any long-term solution should ensure that the legal framework and 
conditions for the use of state aid guarantee sufficient funding of PSB.
Several studies (Seppel, 2015; Jõesaar, 2011; Lauristin, 2009; Shein, 
2005) underline the special role PSM has in small countries like Esto-
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nia. In markets where private broadcasting is commercialised or where 
there is a threat of Russian propaganda, it is especially important that 
PSM maintains its role as a reliable provider and trusted source of infor-
mation. PSM’s role in the public sphere in substantiating and suppor-
ting democratic development and pluralism is crucial having a direct 
influence on society and citizens. Enhancing democracy and cultural 
heritage, improving social cohesion, developing a platform for open de-
bate, guaranteeing media pluralism and being a source of reliable and 
independent information are important functions of PSM. When these 
functions are not fulfilled, the overall development of democratic socie-
ty is under serious threat.
Additional financial resources could help ERR emerge transition 
from a traditional public service broadcasting company into a public 
service media company, introducing new innovative services on all 
platforms (Ibrus, Ojamaa, 2014) and better serving the interests of the 
Russian-speaking population. Funding increases are a question of poli-
tical will. Depending on the political will, the changes in media policies 
towards a new media paradigm can be public-service media supportive 
or limiting (Doyle, 2013; Lowe et al., 2014). 
On the EU level, there are no binding mechanisms dictating the min-
imum funding level a member state should guarantee for PSBs. There 
are no EU financial instruments as there are, for example, solida rity 
funds for infrastructure development dedicated to the enhancement 
of public service media. Decisions regarding the remit, funding model 
and funding level of PSBs are left to member states. There are no com-
mon PSBs models or standards that apply to all countries. Governance 
and financing models, remit, legal frameworks, relations with political 
powers and accountability obligations towards society vary widely. 
Without the support of the EU’s strongly binding legal instru-
ments, Estonian public service broadcasting lacks the funding re-
quired to achieve the same powerful and legitimate position as Western 
European and Nordic public broadcasters (EBU, 2015). In these 
circumstances, instead of the European Commission’s concerns of 
overfunding PSBs of possible violations of state aid regulation, there 
should be legal instruments put in place to ensure that PSBs are not un-
15
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derfunded. In cases of underfunding, it is clear that a PSB’s remits might 
not be fulfilled and citizens’ right to receive democratic and pluralistic 
may not be protected.
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